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Abstract
An equivalence relation is more transparent when complemented by an
explicit specification of the set of transformations under which equivalence
is preserved. In the case of extensive games equivalent with respect to
their strategic normal form, the set of transformations was provided by
Thompson (1952). We extend Thompson’s result to the case of games with
unawareness (Feinberg (2009))
1 Introduction
When are two games equivalent? Given a set of formal objects, an equivalence
relation partitions this set into subsets. Any two members of a subset are then
equivalent with respect to the defined partition. For example, one can partition
the set of extensive games into subsets which share a corresponding reduced
normal form strategic game. Any two extensive games which fall into the same
equivalence class are equivalent with respect to strategic structure, but not in
general equivalent with respect to temporal structure.
Thompson (1952) defines a set of four transformations on extensive games
which preserve the underlying strategic structure. He proves that any two
extensive games which share strategic structure can be transformed into one
another by some sequence of his transformations. This paper extends Thomp-
son’s transformations and his result to games with unawareness (Feinberg
(2009)). In games with unawareness, players may be ignorant of aspects of
game structure (including moves available to them, other players, etc.).
The epistemic structure of a game with unawareness is modeled by a set of
standard games, each of which is indexed by a view. Each game in this set rep-
resents the perspective of some player on the awareness of others. Effectively,
Feinberg has made the hierarchy of “higher-order expectations” discussed in
Lewis (1969) explicit by assigning a game to each. In the limiting case, where
all players are aware of the complete game structure (and aware that others are
aware, ad infinitum) we have common knowledge, and games with unawareness
204 Strategic Equivalence for Unawareness
simply reduce to standard strategic and extensive games. Awareness is just
one way of cashing out the informational relationship between agents and the
world. As such, it exhibits compelling parallels with belief and knowledge;
however, we should be careful not to reduce awareness to either of these con-
cepts. Unlike knowledge, awareness is not factive; unlike belief, awareness
directly constrains the agent’s perception of the game.
What is added to an equivalence notion by explicitly specifying the transformations
under which it remains invariant? One answer is transparency. Consider, for ex-
ample, geometry, in which we have many different notions of equivalence (e.g.
topological equivalence, affine equivalence, similarity, congruence)—what is
the relationship between these equivalence notions? Felix Klein’s Erlangen
program sought to answer this question by organizing geometries into a hier-
archy in accordance with the transformations under which their objects remain
invariant (Klein (1893)). Topological structure remains invariant under arbi-
trary stretching of the plane, rotations, and translations. Affine structure is
invariant under uniform stretching in a single direction, rotations, transla-
tions, and dilations. Similarity is invariant under translations, rotations, and
uniform dilation. Finally, congruence is invariant only under translation and
rotation. Stated in terms of permissible transformations, the relationship be-
tween these various equivalence relations (and the corresponding geometries)
becomes more transparent; we can clearly see, for example, that congruence is
a restriction of similarity which takes size to be meaningful.
We also find the close relationship between equivalence and transforma-
tions in logic, which illustrates a second benefit to making transformational
rules explicit: precision. Proof systems provide a set of permissible transforma-
tions over syntactic objects. Two syntactic objects which share truth value in
all circumstances are logically equivalent. In order to ensure precision of our
logical system, we demand proofs of its soundness and completeness. Soundness
demonstrates that the transformations are indeed permissible, i.e. if one sen-
tence can be transformed into another and vice versa, they are indeed logically
equivalent. Completeness demonstrates that the transformations are adequate
to take any sentence into any other which is logically equivalent. Only once we
have proved both soundness and completeness do we have a satisfactory ac-
count of a logical system. Thompson’s proof demonstrates the soundness and
completeness of his transformations for strategic equivalence. He proves that
they preserve underlying strategic form (soundness), and that for any games
which do share strategic form, they can be reached by applications of his trans-
formations (completeness). Just as the local manipulations of deductive rules
give us insight into the nature of truth (insight not necessarily provided by di-
rect model checking), transformations on extensive games can give us insight
into the nature of strategic structure.
In the context of game theory, much ink has been spilt over the correct analy-
sis of game equivalence. Our view is that there is room in game theory formany
notions of equivalence; ideally, they will eventually be organized into a hierar-
chy in terms of the increasingly strict transformations under which game struc-
ture remains invariant. From this perspective Thompson’s transformations
provide a fruitful starting point for the development of more refined equiva-
lence notions. Contributions to this project can be found scattered throughout
the literature. Kohlberg and Mertens (1986) supplement Thompson’s trans-
formations with two which respectively introduce superfluous chance moves
Tomohiro Hoshi and Alistair Isaac 205
Figure 1: The four Thompson Transformations (after Thompson (1952), fig. 3)
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and remove chance moves. This extends Thompson’s result to games with
chance players (see discussion and refinement in de Bruin (1999)). (Since this
problem has been solved, we omit discussion of chance players in our presenta-
tion below.) Elmes and Reny (1994) address the worry that the transformation
inflation-deflation (see Figure 1) does not preserve perfect information. They
demonstrate that a modification of addition of a superfluous move allows any two
games with perfect information which share a corresponding strategic form to
be transformed into each other without appealing to inflation-deflation. Finally,
Bonanno (1992) investigates the notion of game equivalence which arises from
applications of interchange of moves only; such games are equivalentwith respect
to their set-theoretic form. Bonanno’s motivation is the preservation of temporal
structurewithout introducing an (arbitrary?) ordering overmoveswhich, from
an informational standpoint, are simultaneous. Our hope with this paper is to
contribute to this general endeavor by proving soundness and completeness
for transformations on a richer structure than standard extensive games.
Section 2 outlines Thompson’s basic result and extends it with a new trans-
formation, coalescing of players. The insight behind this addition is that players
who share payoffs are strategically equivalent. Such redundant players do not
usually appear in standard game applications, but they arise in a natural way
when considering games with unawareness. Section 3 introduces strategic and
extensive gameswith unawareness, closely following the treatment of Feinberg
(2009). In Section 3.3 we extend the concept of strategic equivalence to exten-
sive games with unawareness. Two extensive games with unawareness are
strategically equivalent if they share a reduced strategic form with unaware-
ness (modulo coalescing of players). The insight here is that the awareness of
a player may change over the course of a temporally extended game. Such
players must be treated as distinct from a strategic standpoint because they
literally perceive themselves to be playing different games. In situations where
the awareness of a player does not change, however, we prefer to treat them as
a single strategic agent, and this is ensured by coalescing of players. Finally,
Sections 4 and 5 give the main result of the paper. We first introduce transfor-
mations over extensive games with unawareness which correspond to those
provided by Thompson in the standard case. We prove that two extensive
games with unawareness are equivalent with respect to their reduced strategic
form if and only if they can be transformed into each other by some sequence
of these transformations.
2 The Equivalence of Extensive Games
In this section, we summarize Thompson’s work on game equivalence and
develop some basic technical apparatus. Our presentation of Thompson’s
result will be minimal and readers are referred to Thompson (1952) for more
details (see also Osborne and Rubinstein (1994), Section 11.2).
We start with basic definitions for strategic games and extensive games.
Definition 2.1 (Strategic Games). A strategic game (SG) is a tuple g = 〈I, {Ai}i∈I,
{ui}i∈I〉 such that:
• I is a set of players.
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• Ai is the set of actions available to each player.
• ui is a utility function that associates payoffs with action profiles (ai)i∈I in
Πi∈IAi.
For strategic games g, g′, we say g is a restriction of g′, if the sets of players and
actions in g are subsets of those in g′ and the utility function in g is a restriction
of that in g′ with respect to the set of actions in g.
Also two strategic games g, g′ are isomorphic if there is an isomorphic map
between g and g′ in the standard sense. In our notation, isomorphism is
characterized by the following definition.
Definition 2.2 (Isomorphism on SG). Let g = 〈I, {Ai}i∈I, {ui}i∈I〉 and g′ = 〈I′,
{A′i′ }i′∈I′ , {u′i′ }i′∈I′〉. g is isomorphic to g′, written as g  g′, if there are functions
ρ, α, υ such that





i′∈I′ A′i′ is bijective and, for all i and a ∈ Ai, α(a) ∈ A′ρ(i).
3. υ : R→ R is such that υ(ui((ai)i∈I)) = u′ρ(i)((α(ai))i∈I).
If a given set of functions, ρ, α, υ, satisfy the above conditions, we say they
isomorphically map g to g′.
Definition 2.3 (Extensive Games). An extensive game (EG) is a tuple G =
〈(W,≺ ), I, {Ai}i∈I, {Fi}i∈I, {ui}i∈I〉where:
1. (W,≺) is a finite tree with a disjoint union of vertices W = ⋃i∈I Vi ∪ Z
where Vi denotes the set of player i’s decision points and Z is the set of
terminal vertices and the order w′ ≺ w denotes w′ occurs before w on the
tree. We denote the set of immediate successors of w ∈ W by Succ(w).
Also we write w  w′, if w ≺ w′ or w = w′.
2. I is a set of players.
3. Ai maps (w,w′), where w′ ∈ Succ(w), to the action that i can play at w
which leads to w′. It is required that u , v implies Ai(w,u) , Ai(w, v). We
define Ai(w, ·) = {Ai(w, v)|v ∈ Succ(w)}. We define Ai = {Ai(w,w′) | w′ ∈
Succ(w) and w ∈ Vi}.
4. Fi partitions the set Vi and induces the function fi that maps w ∈ Vi to
the information set fi(w) ∈ Fi that contains w. If w ∈ f (w′), we say w is
indistinguishable from w′: otherwise, w is distinguishable from w′ for i.
5. It is required that w′ ∈ fi(w) ∈ Fi implies Ai(w′, ·) = Ai(w, ·).
6. ui : Z→ R is the payoffs for the player i defined on the terminal vertices.
For extensive games G, G′, we say G is a restriction of G′ if information sets,
sets of nodes, players, and actions in G are subsets of those in G′ and the tree
relation≺ and the utility function inG are restrictions of those inG′with respect
to the sets of nodes and actions in G.
We also say that two extensive games, G, G′, are isomorphic if there is an
isomorphic map between G and G′ in the standard sense. In our notation:
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Definition 2.4 (Isomorphism on EG). Let G = 〈(W,≺), I, {Ai}i∈I, {Fi}i∈I, {ui}i∈I〉
with W =
⋃
i∈I Vi ∪ Z and G′ = 〈(W′,≺′), I′, {A′i }i∈I′ , {F′i }i∈I′ , {u′i }i∈I′〉 with W′ =⋃
i′∈I′ V′i′ ∪ Z′ be extensive games. G is isomorphic to G′, written as G  G′, if
there are ρ, α, υ, φ, ι such that
1. α : I → I′ is bijective.
2. φ :
⋃
i∈I Vi ∪ Z→
⋃
i′∈I′ V′i′∈I′ ∪ Z′ is bijective and
(a) for all i ∈ I and v∈ Vi, φ(v) ∈ V′ρ(i)
(b) for all v ∈ Z, φ(v) ∈ Z′











i′∈I′ F′i′ is bijective and, for all f ∈ Fi, ι( f ) = {φ(v) | v ∈ f } ∈
F′ρ(i).
5. υi : R→ R is such that, for all z ∈ Z, υ(ui(z)) = u′ρ(i)(φ(z)).
If a given set of functions, ρ, α, υ, φ, ι, satisfy the above conditions, we say that
they isomorphically map G to G′.
A strategy si of a player i ∈ I in an extensive game 〈(W,≺), I, {Ai}i∈I, {Fi}i∈I, {ui}i∈I〉
is a function that assigns to every f ∈ Fi an action in Ai(w, ·). We denote the
set of i’s strategies in an extensive game by Si. A strategy profile s of players
in I is a sequence (si)i∈I where si ∈ Si. We denote the set of strategy profiles
Πi∈ISi by S. Given s ∈ S, si is the strategy for i in the strategy profile s. The
outcome O(s) of s ∈ S is the terminal node that results when each player i plays
the corresponding game by following si, i.e. O(s) = w1 . . .wK such that, for each
k (1 ≤ k ≤ K), wk ∈ Vi for some i ∈ I and Ai(wk,wk+1) = si( f (wk)).
Definition 2.5 (Strategic Form). The strategic form of an extensive game G =
〈(W,≺), I, {Ai}i∈I, {Fi}i∈I, {ui}i∈I〉 is a strategic game s f (G) = 〈I,S, {Ui}i∈I〉, where
Ui : S→ R is such that Ui(s) = ui(O(s)) for s ∈ S.
Let G = 〈(W,≺), I, {Ai}i∈I, {Fi}i∈I, {ui}i∈I〉. For i ∈ I and s, t ∈ Si, sRit (s is
equivalent to t for i) if for all s, t ∈ S, if si = s, ti = t, and s j = t j for all j ∈ I − {i},
then ui(O(s)) = ui(O(t)). Denote the equivalence class under Ri that contains
s ∈ Si by s¯ and the set of equivalence classes of Si under Ri by S¯i. Let S¯ = Πi∈IS¯i.
Given s ∈ S, write s¯ for the sequence (s¯i)i∈I, where each s¯i is in S¯i.
Definition 2.6 (Reduced Strategic Form). The reduced strategic form red(G) of
an extensive game G = 〈(W,≺), I, {Ai}i∈I, {Fi}i∈I, {ui}i∈I〉 is the strategic game
〈I, S¯, {U¯i}i∈I〉where U¯i(s¯) = ui(O(s)) for every s¯ ∈ S¯with s ∈ S.
Thus the reduced strategic formof an extensive gamedoesnot have redundancy
in the sense that no two strategies of a player result in the same payoff against
all strategies of the other players. The reduced strategic form can be obtained
from the strategic form by simply removing such redundant strategies.
Definition 2.7 (Strategic Equivalence). An extensive game G1 is strategically
equivalent to an extensive game G2, written as G1 ≈ G2, if red(G1)  red(G2).
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Thompson (1952) considers two extensive games to be equivalent if they are
strategically equivalent. He introduces a set of four local manipulations which
are sufficient to transform an extensive game into any strategically equivalent
game. We will not give formal definitions of the Thompson transformations
here, but examples of each are depicted graphically in Figure 1. See Thompson
(1952) for more details. (See also our discussion of the extended versions of
Thompson’s transformations in Definitions 4.4–4.6 and 4.8.)
Definition 2.8 (Transformability). An extensive game G1 is transformable into
G2, written as G1 ∼ G2, if there is a sequence of extensive games, G∗1, . . . ,G∗n,
such that G∗1 = G1, G
∗
n  G2, and G∗i (1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1) is a result of applying one of
Thompson’s transformation rules to G∗i+1.
It is easy to see the four transformation rules preserve strategic equivalence.
Therefore,
Lemma 1. Suppose G1 is transformed into G2 by one of Thompson’s four
transformations. Then G1 ≈ G2. Moreover, if G1 ∼ G2, then G1 ≈ G2.
For the other direction, we need the following lemmas.
Lemma 2. For every extensive game G, there is an extensive game G′ such that
G ∼ G′ and s f (G′)  red(G′).
Let us say G is in canonical form, if s f (G)  red(G′).
Lemma 3. Let G1,G2 be extensive games in canonical form. red(G1)  red(G2)
iff there is an extensive game G∗ such that G1  G∗ with G2 ∼ G∗.
Theorem 1 (Thompson (1952)). For two extensive games, G1,G2, G1 ≈ G2 iff
G1 ∼ G2.
Proof. For the left-to-right direction, suppose G1 ≈ G2. By Lemma 2, G1 and
G2 can be transformed into their canonical forms, G′1,G
′
2. If red(G1)  red(G2),
then red(G′1)  red(G
′
2) (Lemma 1). The desired claim immediately follows from
Lemma 3. 
This result can be extended slightly based on the following consideration.
Strategic equivalence is a plausible analysis of game equivalence if we take
strategies to be differentiated by their payoffs. Strategies which produce the
exact same payoffs are treated as equivalent and all but one of them as re-
dundant. Analogously, we may also take players to be differentiated by their
payoffs. Since all strategic considerations apply equally to suchplayers, wemay
remove “redundant” players without changing the essential strategic structure
of the game.
For illustration, consider the games A and B in Figure 2. The only difference
between these two games is that they are played by different sets of players: A
is played by 1 and 2; B is played by 1, 2, and 3. Despite the different numbers
of players, there is a sense in which these two games are the same. Note that
in B, players 2 and 3 share the same utility function. Since their payoffs are the
same, any strategic analysis of player 3’s performance at the rightmost node
in B must suggest the same action as that applied to player 2’s performance
at the rightmost node in A. This general point applies at every decision point
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Figure 2: Coalescing of Players
in an extensive game; so long as players with identical payoffs are held to the
same standard of rationality, theywill seek to ensure the same outcomes obtain.
These considerations license a stronger notion than strategic equivalence and
the introduction of a new transformation.
Let G = 〈(W,≺), I, {Ai}i∈I, {Fi}i∈I, {ui}i∈I〉 be an extensive game. We define an
equivalence relation RI on I so that, for every i, j ∈ I, iRI j iff ui = u j. Wewrite I¯(i)
for the equivalence class under RI containing i and I¯ for the set of equivalence
classes. The following defines a new transformation that coalesces players with
the same utility function.
Definition 2.9 (Coalescing of Players). Let G1 and G2 be two extensive games
with G1 = 〈(W,≺), I, {Ai}i∈I, {Fi}i∈I, {ui}i∈I〉. We define the equivalence relation ∼0
so thatG1 ∼0 G2 ifG2  G∗ = 〈(⋃j∈I∗ V∗j ∪Z∗,≺∗), I∗, {A∗i}i∈I∗ , {F∗i}i∈I∗ , (u∗i)i∈I∗〉, where












Essentially, this transformation treats different players with the same utility
function as the same player and, conversely, the same player at distinguishable
points of a game as distinct players with identical utility functions.
We now need a new notion of reduced strategic form, corresponding to this
extended sense of equivalence.
Definition 2.10 (p-Reduced Strategic Form). Let G = 〈(W,≺), I, {Ai}i∈I, {Fi}i∈I,
{ui}i∈I〉 be an extensive game. Let the reduced strategic form of G be red(G) =
〈I, S¯, {U¯i}i∈I〉. For every s¯ = (s¯i)i∈I ∈ S¯, define s¯p = (⋃ j∈i s j)i∈I¯. Define S¯p = {s¯p | s¯ ∈
S}. The p-reduced strategic form redp(G) of G is a strategic game 〈I¯, S¯p, {U¯pi }i∈I¯〉
where U¯pi (s¯
p) = U¯i(s).
Next we extend the notions of transformability and equivalence based on the
above definitions. Let G1 and G2 be two extensive games.
Definition 2.11 (p-Transformability). G1 is p-transformable into G2, written as
G1 ∼p G2 if there is a sequence of extensive games,G∗1, . . . ,G∗n, such thatG∗1 = G1,
G∗n  G2, and G∗i (1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1) is a result of applying one of Thompson’s
transformation rules or coalescing of players to G∗i+1.
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Definition 2.12 (p-Equivalence). G1 is p-equivalent to G2, written as G1 ≈p G2 if
redp(G1)  redp(G2).
Theorem 2. For all extensive games, G1,G2, G1 ≈p G2 iff G1 ∼p G2.
Proof. For the right-to-left direction, supposeG1 ∼p G2. Then there is a sequence
G∗1, . . . ,G
∗




k and, for all i (1 ≤ i ≤ k)G∗i is transformable
into G∗i+1 by one application of some transformation rule X. If X is one of
Thompson’s four rules, then red(Gi)  red(Gi+1) (Lemma 1). If X is coalescing
of players, it is clear from Definition 2.9 and 2.10 that redp(Gi)  red(Gi+1) and
thus to redp(Gi+1).
For the left-to-right direction, let I be the set of players in G1. By Lemma 2,
G1 is transformable by Thompson’s four rules into some game G′ such that
s f (G′) = red(G′). Take an extensive game G′′ such that G′ ∼p G′′ where the set
of players in G′′ is I¯. It is clear that s f (G′′) = redp(G′′). The rest of the proof
follows that for Thompson’s theorem. 
3 Games with Unawareness
Our aim is to find corresponding equivalence notions for games with unaware-
ness. We start with basic definitions. Our presentation is minimal; for a full
justification and explication of the definitions, readers are referred to Feinberg
(2009).
Let X be a non-empty set. X∗ is the set of finite sequences of elements in
X. We denote the empty sequence in X by λ. When a sequence v is an initial
segment of a sequence u, wewrite v  u. If v  u but u  v, wewrite v ≺ u. Also
vˆu is the concatenation of the sequences, v and u, in that order. When there
is no danger of confusion, we will use set theoretical notation for sequences.
For instance, for a sequence v and v ∈ X, v ∈ v just means that v appears in the
sequence v.
3.1 Strategic Games with Unawareness (SGU)
The key idea of strategic gameswith unawareness is to assign strategic games to
sequences of players, which are called views. More precisely, given a strategic
game g = 〈I, {Ai}i∈I, {ui}i∈I〉, a view is a sequence of agents v ∈ I∗. A strategic
game γ with unawareness is a collection of restrictions of g that are assigned
in some coherent way (specified in the definition below) to views in a given
set V ⊆ I∗. We say a game assigned to a view is the game that view is aware
of or the view perceives. Each game then constitutes the perspective of the view
to which it is assigned. For example, the game assigned to the view 12 is the
game that player 1 perceives player 2 to be aware of; the game assigned to 121
is that which player 1 perceives player 2 to perceive that player 1 is aware of.
Definition 3.1 (Strategic Games with Unawareness). Let g = 〈I, {Ai}i∈I, {ui}i∈I〉.
Given a set of views V ⊆ I∗ that includes λ, a collection of strategic games,
γ = {gv}v∈V, is a strategic game with unawareness (SGU), if gλ = g (we call this
game the master game of γ) and the following conditions are satisfied, where
gv = 〈Iv, {(Ai)v}i∈Iv , {(ui)v}i∈Iv〉:
C1 For every v ∈ V, vˆv ∈ V iff v ∈ Iv.
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C2 For every vˆ v˜ ∈ V,
1. v ∈ V
2. ∅ , Ivˆ v˜ ⊆ Iv
3. ∅ , (Ai)vˆ v˜ ⊆ (Ai)v for all i ∈ Ivˆ v˜
C3 If vˆvˆ v˜ ∈ V, then gvˆvˆ v˜ = gvˆvˆvˆ v˜ and vˆvˆvˆ v˜ ∈ V.
C4 For every action profile (a)vˆ v˜ = {(a j)} j∈Ivˆ v˜ , there exists a completion to an
action profile (a)v = {a j, ak} j∈Ivˆ v˜,k∈Iv\Ivˆ v˜ such that
(ui)vˆ v˜((a)vˆ v˜) = (ui)v((a)v).
Intuitively, C1 says that players must assign perspectives on the game to all
the players they can see. C2 ensures that perspectives only include aspects of
the game that can be seen from that view; if I don’t know that X is an option,
then I can’t perceive you as seeing X as an option. C3 stipulates common
knowledge of reflexivity; players are always aware of what they are aware of
(and other players know this and assign perspectives accordingly). Finally C4
is a consistency condition; it ensures that if a player cannot see the entire game,
the outcomes that player can see do all obtain in the master game.
Definition 3.2 (Isomorphism on SGU). Let γ = {gv}v∈V and γ′ = {gv′ }v′∈V′ be
SGU’s with g, g′ their master games. We say γ is isomorphic to γ′, written as γ 
γ′, if there are functions, ρ, α, υ between g and g′, as specified in Definition 2.2,
such that g  g′, and:
1. V′ = {ρ(v1) . . . ρ(vk) |v1 . . .vk ∈ V}
2. for each gv ∈ γ, the restrictions of ρ, α, υwith respect to gv isomorphically
map gv to gρ(v), where ρ(v) = ρ(i1) . . . ρ(in) with v = i1 . . . in.
When a given set of functions, ρ, α, υ, satisfy the above conditions, we say that
they isomorphically map γ to γ′.
3.2 Extensive Games with Unawareness (EGU)
Strategic games with unawareness assigned strategic games to sequences of
players. Since the awareness of a player may change throughout the course of
a game, this strategy will not work in the context of extensive games with un-
awareness. Instead, we assign extensive games to sequences of decision points.
This allows different states of awareness of a single player to be distinguished
by the decision point at which they occur. LetG = 〈(W,≺), I, {Ai}i∈I, {Fi}i∈I, {ui}i∈I〉
be an extensive game. ThenW =
⋃
i∈I Vi∪Z, where eachVi is the set of player i’s
decision points. The set of viewpoints is the set of all decision points V =
⋃
i∈I Vi.
The set of views is the set of all finite sequences of viewpoints is V¯ =
⋃∞
n=0 V(n).
We denote views by italicized letters, such as v, u, etc. and viewpoints by
unitalicized letters, such as v, u, etc.
An extensive game with unawareness is a collection of restrictions of G that
are assigned in a coherent way to views inV ⊆ V¯. We say a game assigned to
a view is the game that view is aware of or the view perceives, as in the case of
SGU’s. The game assigned to vˆu, where v ∈ V1 and u ∈ V2, is the game that
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player 1 at v perceives player 2 at u to be aware of; the game assigned to vˆu,
where v, u ∈ V1 is the game that player 1 at v perceives himself to be aware of
at u. When it is clear, we will say a viewpoint v perceives a game, etc., ignoring
the distinction between viewpoints and players.
Definition 3.3 (Extensive Games with Unawareness). Let G = 〈(W,≺), I, {Ai}i∈I,
{Fi}i∈I, {ui}i∈I〉. Given a set of views V ⊆ V¯ that includes λ, a collection of
extensive games, Γ = {Gv}v∈V is an extensive game with unawareness (EGU) if
Gλ = G (we call this game the master game) and the following conditions are
satisfied, where Gv = 〈(Wv,≺v), Iv, {(Ai)v}i∈Iv , {(Fi)v}i∈Iv , {(ui)v}i∈Iv〉:
CE1 For every v ∈ V, v ∈ Vi, vˆv ∈ V iff i ∈ Iv, v ∈ (Vi)v
CE2 For every vˆ v˜ ∈ V,
1. v ∈ V
2. ∅ ,Wvˆ v˜ ⊆Wv
3. ∅ , Ivˆ v˜ ⊆ Iv.
CE3 For every vˆ v˜ ∈ V, i ∈ Ivˆ v˜, and w ∈ (Vi)vˆ v˜,
1. (Vi)vˆ v˜ = (Vi)v ∩ (Wvˆ v˜)\Zvˆ v˜
2. (Fi)vˆ v˜ = { f ∩ (Wvˆ v˜\Zvˆ v˜)| f ∈ (Fi)v}
3. (Ai)vˆ v˜(w,w′) = (Ai)v(w,w′′) for the unique successor w′′ of w in Wv
such that w′′  w′, where w′ is the successor of w inWvˆ v˜.
CE4 If vˆvˆ v¯ ∈ V with v ∈ Vi, then:
1. fi(v) ∩ (Vi)vˆv , ∅, and for any v˜ ∈ fi(v), Gv = Gv˜
2. for every sequence v˜ all of whose elements are from fi(v) ∩ (Vi)vˆv,
Gvˆvˆ v¯ = Gvˆ v˜ˆ v¯, and
3. vˆ v˜ˆ v¯ ∈ V.
CE5 Let vˆ v¯ ∈ V. For every terminal nodew ∈ Zvˆ v¯, there exists a nodew′ ∈ Zv
such that w ≺ w′ and (ui)vˆ v¯(w) = (ui)v(w′).
We denote Gλ by G = 〈(W,≺), I, {Ai}i∈I, {Fi}i∈I, {ui}i∈I〉.
Conditions CE1, CE2, and CE3 do essentially the same work for EGU as C1
and C2 did for SGU, ensuring that nodes assign views to all nodes they can see
and do so in a consistent manner. CE5 corresponds toC4, ensuring that payoffs
in restricted games are always consistent with outcomes which might obtain
in the master game. A remark is in order concerning condition CE4. Feinberg
(2009) has a weaker condition, which states that vˆvˆ v¯ ∈ V with v ∈ Vi implies
fi(v) ∩ (Vi)vˆv , ∅, and if v˜ ∈ fi(v) ∩ (Vi)vˆv then vˆvˆv˜ˆ . . . ˆv˜ˆ v¯ ∈ V and
Gvˆvˆ v˜ = Gvˆvˆv˜ˆ v˜ = · · · = Gvˆvˆv˜ˆ ...ˆv˜ˆ v˜
Discussing the condition, Feinberg writes “This definition follows the interpre-
tation of an information set as representing indistinguishable information and
indistinguishable awareness” (22). However, the condition is still weak for the
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stated purpose, since it allows for the possibility that two nodes indistinguish-
able in the master game assign different perspectives to the game so long as nei-
ther can see each other. If this possibility obtained, however, it would violate the
intuitive restriction Feinberg states that indistinguishable nodes should exhibit
the exact same awareness of game structure. Our stronger condition conforms
more closely to C3, stipulating not only that nodes within an information set
must have the same perspective (reflexivity), but also that all players are aware
of this property and assign perspectives accordingly (common knowledge of
reflexivity). This stronger condition is needed for the proof of Theorem 4.
Definition 3.4 (Isomorphism on EGU). Let Γ = {Gv}v∈V and Γ′ = {Gv′ }v′∈V′ be
EGU’s with G, G′ their master games. We say Γ is isomorphic to Γ′, written
as Γ  Γ′, if there are functions, ρ, α, υ, φ, ι between G and G′, as specified in
Definition 2.4, such that G  G′, and:
1. V′ = {φ(v1) . . . φ(vk) |v1 . . .vk ∈ V}
2. for each Gv ∈ Γ, the restrictions of ρ, α, υ, φ, ι with respect to Gv isomor-
phically map Gv to Gφ(v), where φ(v) = φ(v1) . . . φ(vn) with v =v1 . . .vn.
When a given set of functions, ρ, α, υ, φ, ι, satisfy the above conditions, we say
that they isomorphically map Γ to Γ′.
3.3 Strategic Forms and Equivalence on EGU
When are two EGU’s strategically equivalent? We must begin by defining the
SGU which corresponds to a given EGU. At a first pass, we might reduce all
extensive games in the EGU to their corresponding strategic forms. If one
adopts this approach, the strategic form of an EGU Γ will be the collection
of strategic forms of extensive games in Γ that are assigned to views in G.
However, views in an EGU are sequences of viewpoints, whereas views in an
SGU are sequences of players. A natural move here is to induce sequences
of players from sequences of viewpoints in terms of the associated players.
Unfortunately, this strategy still does not work, since different viewpoints in
a view can be associated with a single player. For illustration, consider the
possibility that v and u are distinct (distinguishable) viewpoints for player 1,
but Gvˆu and Guˆv do not share the same strategic form. In an SGU, we cannot
associate two distinct games with the corresponding sequence of players, 1ˆ1.
Therefore, for the strategic form of an EGU Γ, we consider distinguishable
viewpoints of player i (in themaster gameG) as being played bydistinct players
with the same utility function as i. This decision mirrors the conceptual point
that, if a player’s state of awareness changes during the game, then the strategic
analysis of that player must change as well. Furthermore, if player 1 perceives
player 2’s state of awareness as changing (even if it does not actually change),
player 1 must play as if the two states of player 2’s awareness are strategically
distinct. (For a related discussion, see the analysis of solution concepts for
games with unawareness in Feinberg (2009).)
Given an EGU Γ = {Gv}v∈V, define the equivalence relation RVi so that, for
all v, u ∈ Vi, uRViv iff Gvˆvˆ v˜ = Gvˆuˆ v˜ for all vˆvˆ v˜, vˆuˆ v˜ ∈ V. The relation RVi
partitions the setVi of player i’s viewpoints. Wedenote by V¯i(v) the equivalence
class under RVi that contains v ∈ Vi. Note that, by CE4 in Definition 3.3, every
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information set f ∈ Fi is such that f ⊆ V¯i(v) for some v. The following operation
relabels players in an EGU with the equivalence classes V¯i(v).
Definition 3.5 (p-Normal Form). Let Γ = {Gv}v∈V be an EGU and for each
v ∈ V, Gv = 〈(⋃i∈Iv (Vi)v ∪ Z,≺v), Iv, {(Ai)v}i∈Iv , {(Fi)v}i∈Iv , {(ui)v}i∈Iv〉. The p-normal




i )v∪Zpv,≺pv), Ipv, {(Api )v}i∈Ipv ,
{(Fpi )v}i∈Ipv , {(u
p
i )v}i∈Ipv 〉 is defined by:
1. Ipv = {V¯i(vi) | vi ∈ (Vi)v}, and for each i ∈ Ipv
2. (Vpi )v = i ∩ (Vi)v, Zpv = Zv and ≺pv=≺v
3. (Api )v(w,w
′) = (Ai)v(w,w′) with w ∈ (Vpi )v and i ⊆ Vi
4. (Fpi )v = { f ∩ i | f ∈ (Fi)v and f ∩ i , ∅}with i ⊆ Vi
5. (upi )v = (ui)v where i ⊆ Vi
To find the strategic form of an EGU Γ, first transform it into its p-normal
form, then take the strategic form of each game in Γp.
Definition 3.6 (Strategic Form for EGU). Let Γ = {Gv}v∈V be an EGU with
G its master game. The strategic form of Γ is a collection of strategic games
s f (Γ) = {gv′ }v′∈V′ defined as follows:
1. i1 . . . in ∈ V′ iff v1 . . .vn ∈ V and ik (1 ≤ k ≤ n) is the player at the
viewpoint vk in Γp.
2. Each gv = s f (G
p
v).
As discussed above, the definition of Γp ensures that the game assigned to each
view v in s f (Γ) is always unique. Therefore, the strategic form of an EGU is
well-defined. Indeed let v,u ∈ V be distinct views and set v =v1 . . .vn and
u =u1 . . .un with vk ∈ Vpik and uk ∈ V
p
jk
(1 ≤ k ≤ n). If i1 . . . in=j1 . . . jn, then vk
and uk are either identical or in the same equivalence class under RVi . By the
definition of p-normal form, Gpv = G
p
u.
To show that s f (Γ) is indeed a strategic game with unawareness, we need
one proposition. Let G,G′ be extensive games such that G′ is a restriction of G.
The following structural result is straightforward.
Proposition 1. s f (G′) is a restriction of s f (G).
Given this proposition, it is easy to check that the conditions CE1-5 on an
EGU Γ in Definition 3.3 guarantee that s f (Γ) satisfies the conditions C1-4 in
Definition 3.1. If Gvˆv is a restriction of Gv, as required by CE1-5, the strategic
form red(Gvˆv) (defined in Definition 2.5) is a restriction of red(Gv), as required
by C1-4. Therefore, we have:
Proposition 2. s f (Γ) is a strategic game with unawareness.
We can similarly define the reduced strategic form for EGU.
Definition 3.7 (Reduced Strategic Form for EGU). Let Γ = {Gv}v∈V be an EGU
with G its master game. The reduced strategic form of Γ is a collection of strategic
games red(Γ) = {gv′ }v′∈V′ defined as follows:
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1. i1 . . . in ∈ V′ iff v1 . . .vn ∈ V and ik (1 ≤ k ≤ n) is the player at the
viewpoint vk in Γp.
2. Each gv is the restriction g∗ of red(Gp) such that g∗  red(G
p
v).
(The reason that we can’t simply take gv to be red(G
p
v) is that the operation red
takes the equivalence classes of strategies in Gpv, which may be different from
those in Gp since Gp may contain more strategies than its restriction, Gpv.)
A similar argument to the one above applies to red(Γ). Thus it is straightfor-
ward to show:
Proposition 3. red(Γ) is a strategic game with unawareness.
Next let us consider the notion that corresponds to p-reduced strategic form.
As we saw in Section 2, the intuition behind the p-reduced strategic form is that
it removes redundant players (i.e. players who share the same payoffs) from
the reduced strategic form. For a game with unawareness, players may not be
redundant, even if they share the same payoffs, since they may have different
perspectives on the game. For example, there may be players i, j ∈ I such that
ui = u j yet Ai , A j. We can interpret such players in two ways. They may
represent different epistemic states of the same player (say, his perspective on
the game at different times), or they may represent players on the same “team”
who share interests but have different states of knowledge about the game. In
either case, the difference between such players is strategically significant, so
we wish to keep both in the p-reduced strategic form. Therefore, in order to be
considered redundant, players must share both payoffs and perspectives on the
game.
We nowmake this idea precise for the definition of p-reduced strategic form
on EGU. Let Γ be a p-normal EGU {Gv}v∈V. Let I be the set of players in the
master game G. Define an equivalence relation RI on I such that, for i, j ∈ I, iRI j
iff
1. ui = u j
2. for all vˆvi ˆ v˜, vˆv j ˆ v˜ ∈ V with vi ∈ Vi and v j ∈ V j,
Gvˆvi ˆ v˜ = Gvˆv j ˆ v˜.
Item 2 is the formalization of the above preliminary discussion of perspectives.
It guarantees that, ifwhat anyplayer (including i and j) perceives that iperceives
and what that player perceives that j perceives are always the same, then it is
redundant to consider i and j as distinct players.
Replace RI in Definition 2.10 with its new statement and redefine redp. We
write I¯(i) for the equivalence relation under RI that contains i. We can now
define the p-reduced strategic form for EGU.
Definition 3.8 (p-Reduced Strategic Form). Let Γ = {Gv}v∈V be an EGU with
G its master game. The strategic form of Γ is a collection of strategic games
redp(Γ) = {gv′ }v′∈V′ defined as follows:
1. I¯(i1) . . . I¯(in) ∈ V′ iff v1 . . .vn ∈ V and ik (1 ≤ k ≤ n) is the player at the
viewpoint vk in Γp.
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2. Each gv is the restriction g∗ of redp(Gp) such that g∗  redp(G
p
v).
We need to check that the p-reduced strategic form is well-defined. Indeed let
v,u ∈ V be distinct views and put v =v1 . . .vn and u =u1 . . .un with vk ∈ Vik
and uk ∈ V jk (1 ≤ k ≤ n). If I¯(i1) . . . I¯(in)=I¯(j1) . . . I¯(jn), then (i) vk, uk are identical
or in the same information set (by p-normality), or (ii) ikRIjk (by definition). In
each case, we have Gv = Gu by definition of RI. Therefore, the above definition
is well-defined.
Also, it is straightforward to check:
Proposition 4. redp(Γ) is a strategic game with unawareness.
Given the definition of p-reduced strategic form, we can now formulate the
definition of strategic equivalence on EGU.
Definition 3.9 (Strategic Equivalence on EGU). Γ1 is equivalent to Γ2, written
as Γ1 ≈ Γ2, if redp(Γ1) is isomorphic to redp(Γ2).
4 Transformations on EGU
Before introducing the transformations for games with unawareness, we need
some supplementary definitions. Given an extensive game G, Gv is the sub-
game of G whose root is v. The following definition for v|iu ensures that two
viewpoints, v and u, are the product of different actions by the player i.
Definition 4.1 (Inflation Suitability for i). v|iu if there are v′,u′ ∈ Vi, v′′, u′′
such that v′ ∈ fi(u′), v′′  v, and u′′  u; Ai(v′,v′′) , Ai(u′,u′′).
We can now define the transformations on EGU which preserve strategic
equivalence. We will formulate transformations as equivalence relations on
EGU, as Thompson did on EG. Below let Γ = {Gv}v∈V and Γ′ = {G′v′ }v′∈V′ be
EGU’s. Also let G = 〈(W,≺), I, {Ai}i∈I, {Fi}i∈I, {ui}i∈I〉 be the master game of Γ.
Our first transformation takes an EGU into one that has the same p-normal
form (as in Definition 3.5). If a player i has distinguishable viewpoints with
different perspectives (in the sense of the definition of RI above), this transfor-
mation “splits” player i and relabels the viewpoints with different perspectives
as viewpoints of distinct players.
Definition 4.2 (Splitting of Players). Γ ∼s Γ′ if Γp  Γ′.
For the p-reduced strategic form of an EGU, we take the p-normal form of the
EGUand transform extensive games in it into their p-strategic forms. Therefore,
this transformation preserves strategic equivalence on EGU.
The second transformation allows us to consider distinct players i, j equiv-
alent with respect to RI as the same player.
Definition 4.3 (Coalescing of Players). Γ ∼c Γ′ if there is an i∗ such that Γ 
Γ∗ = {G∗v}v∈V, where each G∗v = 〈(
⋃
j∈I∗ V∗j ∪ Z∗,≺∗), I∗, {A∗i }i∈I∗ , {F∗i }i∈I∗ , (u∗i )i∈I∗〉 in Γ∗
is defined by
1. I∗ = Iv − (I¯v(i∗) − {i∗})
2. V∗i∗ =
⋃
j∈I¯(i∗)(V j)v and V∗i = (Vi)v for i < I¯(i
∗)
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3. Z∗ = Zv and ≺∗=≺v
4. F∗i∗ =
⋃




j∈I¯(i∗)(A j)v and A∗i = (Ai)v for i < I¯(i
∗).
For the p-reduced strategic formof an EGU,we take the equivalence class under
RI on the set of players I. Therefore, this transformation preserves strategic
equivalence on EGU. Intuitively, coalescing of players and splitting of players
together ensure that we can take any EGU into one with neither redundant
players nor players whose perspective changes over the course of the game, i.e.
one with the minimal number of distinct players.
The rest of the transformations are extensions of those in Thompson (1952).
The essential idea here is that we transform the master game of Γ in accor-
dance with Thompson’s original transformation, then ensure that correspond-
ing changes are made to all Gv ∈ Γ. Readers are referred again to Figure 1 for
intuitive motivation.
Definition 4.4 (Inflation-Deflation). Γ ∼1 Γ′ if there are v, u ∈W, and i ∈ I such
that for any v′ ∈ fi(v) and u′ ∈ fi(u), v′|iu′ (in G), and Γ′  Γ∗ = {G∗v}v∈V, where
each G∗v in Γ∗ is exactly the same as Gv except when both v and u are in Wv,
in which case the information partition F∗i in G
∗ is ((Fi)v − {( fi)v(v), ( fi)v(u)}) ∪
{( fi)v(v) ∪ ( fi)v(u)}.
Inflation-deflation adds and removes perfect recall. It preserves underlying
strategic form because it does not change the set of strategies available to any
player, merely the size of his information sets. Of course, in general, enlarg-
ing information sets will eliminate potential strategies, but inflation suitability
(Definition 4.1) ensures that inflation-deflation can only be applied to infor-
mation sets which are distinguished by an earlier move, thus ensuring that
strategies remain distinct. Therefore the reduced strategic form is unchanged.
Definition 4.5 (Addition of a Superfluous Move). Γ ∼2 Γ′ if there are v,u1,u2 ∈
W with Succ(v) = {u1,u2} such that
1. for every v ∈ V such that u1, u2 ∈ Wv, there exist ρv, αv, υv, φv, ιv, as
specified in Definition 3.4, such that
• they isomorphically map Gu1v to Gu2v
• for any w  u1, φv(w) ∈ ( fi)v(w)
2. Γ′  Γ∗ = {Gv}v∈V∗ , where
• V∗ =V− {v|∃x ∈ {{v} ∪ {w|u2  w}}(x ∈ v)}
• each G∗v is exactly the same as Gv except that the tree Wv in G is
replaced with Wv − ({v} ∪ {w|u2  w}) and ≺v and other items in Gv
are restricted toWv − ({v} ∪ {w|u2  w}).
Addition of a superfluous move adds a move which has no effect on the strategic
structure of the game (in this case, the move at node v). The irrelevance
of this move is ensured by the bijection between u1 and u2; since the move
produces identical, indistinguishable outcomes, it is irrelevant for decision
making purposes. One potential worry in extending this transformation to
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games with unawareness is the role that node v has in views on the game.
However, since the irrelevance of the move at v obtains in all restrictions of the
master game, no such view can affect strategic decisions and the corresponding
reduced strategic form is preserved.
Definition 4.6 (Coalescing of Moves). Γ ∼3 Γ′ if there are {v1, . . . ,vk} = fi(v1)
and {u1, . . . ,uk} = fi(u1) such that
1. um ∈ Succ(vm) for 1 ≤ m ≤ k
2. Ai(vm,um) = Ai(vn,un) for 1 ≤ m,n ≤ k.
3. vˆvm ˆ v˜, vˆum ˆ v˜ ∈ V implies Gvˆvm ˆ v˜ = Gvˆum ˆ v˜ for 1 ≤ m ≤ k
4. Γ′  Γ∗ = {G∗v}v∈V∗ , where Γ∗ is defined by:
• V∗ =V− {v | ∃x ∈ {u1, . . . ,uk}(x ∈ v)}
• each G∗v is the same as Gv except that Wv is replaced with Wv −{u1, . . .uk} and≺v andother items inG are restricted toWv−{u1, . . .uk}.
Coalescing of moves combines into a single decision point moves made by the
same player in sequence. Again, the main worry in extending this transfor-
mation to games with unawareness is ensuring that the transformation only
applies when the player’s state of awareness does not change between the in-
formation sets. This restriction is taken care of by condition 3, ensuring that
the reduced strategic form remains unchanged.
We now define the final transformation: interchange of moves. We say an
extensive game G is binary, if for any viewpoint v in G, Succ(v) ≤ 2. Similarly
EGU Γ = {Gv}v∈V is binary, if for all v ∈ V, Gv is binary.
Definition 4.7 (IM Suitability). Let G = 〈(W,≺), I, {Ai}i∈I, {Fi}i∈I, {ui}i∈I〉 be a
binary extensive game. G is IM suitable if there are distinct viewpoints,
v,u1,u2 ∈W and i, j ∈ I such that
1. v ∈ Vi and u1,u2 ∈ V j
2. Succ(v) = {u1,u2}
3. u2 ∈ f j(u1)
If themaster game of Γ is IM suitable, wewould like to be able to apply Thomp-
son’s interchange of moves transformation. However, we need to guarantee
our extension of this transformation preserves conditions CE1–CE5, in partic-
ular, that all Gv ∈ Γ are still restrictions of the master game. In order to do this,
we need to consider several cases which might obtain with respect to the view-
points, v,u1,u2 in any Gv. We define the operation IM to produce an extensive
game IM(G0) on restrictions G0 of the extensive game G in the following way.
Below we denote each item of IM(G) by items in G superscripted with IM.
IM1 If none of v,u1,u2 are in G0, IM(G0) = G0.
IM2 If all of v,u1,u2 are in G0 and there are distinct viewpoints, w1,w2, x1, x2
in G0 such that Succ(u1) = {w1,w2}, Succ(u2) = {x1, x2}, then:
(a) G − Gv = IM(G) − (IM(G))v
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(b) (IM(G))wk = Gwk and IM(G)xk = Gxk (k ∈ {1, 2})
(c) u1,u2 ∈ VIMi and v ∈ VIMj in IM(G)
(d) SuccIM(u1) = {w1, x1} and SuccIM(u2) = {w2, x2}
(e) f IMi (u1) = ( fi(v) − {v}) ∪ {u1,u2} and f IMj (v) = ( f j(u1) − {u1,u2}) ∪ {v}
(f) • AIMi (u1,w1) = AIMi (u2, x1) = Ai(v,u1)
• AIMi (u1,w2) = AIMi (u2, x2) = Ai(v,u2)
• AIMj (v,u1) = A j(u1,w1) = A j(u2, x1)
• AIMj (v,u2) = A j(u1,w2) = A j(u2, x2)
IM3 If all of v,u1,u2 are inG0 and there are distinct viewpoints, w, x inG0 such
that Succ(u1) = {w}, Succ(u2) = {x}, then:
(a) G − Gv = IM(G) − (IM(G))v
(b) (IM(G))w = Gw and IM(G)x = Gx
(c) u1 ∈ VIMi and v ∈ VIMj
(d) SuccIM(u1) = {w, x}
(e) f IMi (u1) = ( fi(v) − {v}) ∪ {u1} and f IMj (v) = ( f j(u1) − {u1,u2}) ∪ {v}
(f) • AIMj (v,u1) = A j(u1,w) = A j(u2, x)
• AIMi (u1,w) = Ai(v,u1)
• AIMi (u1, x) = Ai(v,u2)
IM4 If only v,u1 are in G0 and there are distinct viewpoints, w1,w2 in G0 such
that Succ(u1) = {w1,w2}, then:
(a) G − Gv = IM(G) − (IM(G))v
(b) (IM(G))wk = Gwk (k ∈ {1, 2})
(c) u1,u2 ∈ VIMi and v ∈ VIMj in IM(G)
(d) SuccIM(v) = {u1,u2}, SuccIM(u1) = {w1}, and SuccIM(u2) = {w2}
(e) f IMi (u1) = ( fi(v) − {v}) ∪ {u1,u2} and f IMj (v) = ( f j(u1) − {u1}) ∪ {v}
(f) • AIMj (v,u1) = A j(u1,w1)
• AIMj (v,u2) = A j(u1,w2)
• AIMi (u1,w1) = AIMi (u2,w2) = Ai(v,u1)
IM5 If only v,u2 are in G0 and there are distinct viewpoints, x1, x2 in G0 such
that Succ(u2) = {x1, x2}, then IM(G0) is defined just as in IM4 except with
u1,u2,w1,w2 replaced by u2,u1, x1, x2 respectively.
IM6 If only v,u1 are inG0 and there is a viewpoint w inG0 such that Succ(u1) =
{w}, then:
(a) G − Gv = IM(G) − (IM(G))v
(b) (IM(G))w = Gw
(c) u1 ∈ VIMi and v ∈ VIMj
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Figure 3: IM2–IM7
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(d) f IMi (u1) = ( fi(v) − {v}) ∪ {u1} and f IMj (v) = ( f j(u1) − {u1}) ∪ {v}
(e) • AIMj (v,u1) = A j(u1,w)
• AIMi (u1,w) = Ai(v,u1)
IM7 If only v,u2 are in G0 and there is a viewpoint x in G0 such that Succ(u2) =
{x}, then IM(G0) is defined just as in IM6 except with u1, w replaced with
u2, x respectively.
The operation IM “interchanges” the moves of players i and j in the region
of G0 corresponding to v,u1,u2 ∈ W (as in Definition 4.7), leaving the rest of
the game tree unchanged. When u1 and u2 are each followed by two daughter
nodes, it transforms the game as in Thompson’s original interchange of moves.
IM also interchanges the moves of players i and j when the specified part
of the tree is restricted in G0. Since we assume that G is binary, the cases
provided in the above definition exhaust all possible restrictions of G affecting
the interchange of nodes v, u1, and u2 (see Figure 3).
Definition 4.8 (Interchange of Moves). Γ ∼4 Γ′ if (i) Γ is binary, (ii) there are
v,u1,u2 ∈ W and i, j ∈ I in the master game G of Γ that satisfy IM Suitability,
and (iii) Γ′  Γ∗ = {G∗v∗ }v∗∈V∗ , whereV∗ and each G∗v∗ are defined as follows:
1. The master game of Γ∗ = G∗λ is IM(G).
2. v∗ ˆv∗ ∈ V∗ iff v∗ ∈ V∗ and v∗ is in Gv∗
3. G∗v∗ = IM(Gv∗ ) for v∗ ∈ V
4. G∗v∗ ˆv∗ is a restriction of G
∗
v∗ that is isomorphic to IM(Gv0 ) for v
∗ ˆv∗ <
V, where v0 is in V and obtained by replacing some occurrences of u1
(respectively, u2) in v∗ ˆv∗ with u2 (respectively, u1).
A brief comment on point 4 is in order. It ensures that the node introduced
in IM4 (respectively, IM5) agrees in its awareness with the other node in its
information set. We have stated the condition slightly imprecisely to suppress
irrelevant bookkeeping details.
It is straightforward to check that the Γ∗ constructed in Definition 4.8 is an
EGU. Given IM and the fourth condition in this definition, restrictions Gv of G
get transformed to restrictions of IM(G).
Two remarks. First, interchange of moves may only be applied to a bi-
nary EGU. However, it is always possible to convert an EGU into a binary
EGU through successive applications of coalescing of moves and addition of
superfluous moves (as in Thompson’s original result). Second, V∗ is different
from V. If Gv (v ∈ V) is of the form specified in IM4 (or IM5), then Gv does
not contain u2 (respectively, u1), but IM(Gv) will contain u2 (respectively, u1).
This means that vˆu2 < V (since u2 is not in Gv, by CE1 in Definition 3.3), yet
vˆu2 ∈ V∗. However, the corresponding reduced strategic form is not changed
because it collapses all nodes within an information set to a single decision
point.
Definition 4.9 (Transformability on EGU). Γ1 is transformable into Γ2, written
as Γ1 ∼ Γ2, if there is a sequence of EGU’s, Γ∗1, . . . ,Γ∗n such that Γ∗1 = Γ1, Γ∗n is
isomorphic to Γ2, and Γ∗i ∼t Γi+1 (1 ≤ i ≤ n − 1) with t ∈ {s, c, 1, 2, 3, 4} (Γi is the
result of applying one of the rules defined above to Γi+1).
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5 Equivalence and Transformability
Given the definitions for strategic equivalence and transformability on EGU,
we now prove the following result on EGU analogous to Thompson’s result on
extensive games: For every EGU Γ1,Γ2, Γ1 ∼ Γ2 iff Γ1 ≈ Γ2.
As we discussed above, it is straightforward to see that the transformations
defined in Definitions 4.2–4.6 and 4.8 preserve strategic equivalence. Readers
are invited to verify this.
Theorem 3. Γ1 ∼ Γ2 implies Γ1 ≈ Γ2.
For the other direction, we need some lemmas. First note the following
facts about the transformations defined above. An application of a transfor-
mation transforms the master game of a given EGU Γ in the same way as the
corresponding rule for extensive games; furthermore, the games Gv ∈ Γ are
each transformed similarly. For instance, an application of coalescing of moves
to Γ will coalesce moves in the master game G of Γ in exactly the same fash-
ion as Thompson’s coalescing of moves would on G as a standard extensive
game. Likewise, if they appear, the same moves are coalesced in each Gv ∈ Γ.
Therefore, the following is a consequence of Lemma 2:
Observation 1. Let Γ be an EGU and G its master game. There is an EGU Γ′
with G′ its master game such that Γ ∼ Γ′ and s f (G′) is isomorphic to redp(G′).
Next, note that the extensive game assigned to each view is a restriction
of the master game G. Also a brief inspection of Definition 2.10 reveals that
any restriction of an extensive game in canonical form is an extensive game in
canonical form. Therefore, in the above proposition, if s f (G′) is isomorphic to
redp(G′), for any restriction G′v in Γ′, s f (G′v) is isomorphic to redp(G′v). Therefore,
we have the following result that is analogous to Lemma 2 on extensive games.
Lemma 4. For every EGU Γ, there is an EGU Γ′ such that Γ ∼ Γ′ and s f (Γ′) is
isomorphic to redp(Γ′).
Let us say an EGU Γ is in canonical form if s f (Γ′) is isomorphic to redp(Γ).
Finally, we need a result analogous to Lemma 3.
Lemma 5. Let Γ, Γ′ be EGU’s in canonical form. redp(Γ) is isomorphic to redp(Γ′)
iff there is an EGU Γ∗ such that Γ is isomorphic to Γ∗ with Γ′ ∼ Γ∗.
Proof. The right-to-left direction is clear by Theorem 3. For the other direction,
by Lemma 4, we can assumewithout loss of generality that Γ, Γ′ are in canonical
form. Moreover, by splitting of players (Definition 4.2), we can transform Γ, Γ′
into p-normal form. Therefore, we can assume that Γ and Γ′ are both isomorphic
to their p-normal forms.
Next, let G, G′ be the master games of Γ, Γ′ respectively. By Lemma 3, there
is an extensive game G∗ such that G  G∗ and G′ ∼ G∗. Thus there is a function
φ as specified in Definition 3.4 between the set of viewpoints in G and the set
of viewpoints in G∗. Also, given G′ ∼ G∗, there is an EGU Γ∗ such that Γ′ ∼ Γ∗
and G∗ is the master game of Γ∗. Set Γ = {Gv}v∈V and Γ∗ = {G∗v∗ }v∗∈V∗ . Define a
function Φ fromV toV∗ so that, for all v =v1 . . .vn ∈ V, Φ(v) = φ(v1) . . . φ(vn).
Our goal is to show that Γ is isomorphic to Γ∗. Let Vk = {v | v ∈
V and len(v) = k}, where len(v) is the length of v. By Definition 3.4, it suf-
fices to show that, for all v ∈ V with len(v) = k,
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1. {Φ(w) | w ∈ Vlen(v)} =V∗k, and
2. Gv  GΦ(v) with Gv and GΦ(v) in canonical form.
Since 1 implies Φ is one-to-one, and, from 2 and Definition 3.4, it follows that Γ
is isomorphic to Γ∗.
We prove the claim by induction on the length of v ∈ V. The base case
is clear. For the inductive step, first note that the functions that isomorphi-
cally map G to G∗ induce the functions that isomorphically map redp(G) to
redp(G∗). Also, given Definition 2.2, if redp(Γ)  redp(Γ∗), the functions in-
duce the functions that isomorphically map redp(Γ) to redp(Γ∗). In particu-
lar, define a function ρ : I → I∗ such that, for all vi in G and v∗i∗ in G∗ with
φ(vi) =v∗i∗ , ρ(i) = i
∗. Then ρ is a function as specified in Definition 3.2. Put
redp(Γ) = {gu}u∈U and redp(Γ∗) = {gu∗ }u∗∈U∗ . Now, by the inductive hypothesis,
{Φ(w) | w ∈ Vlen(v)} = V∗k for an arbitrary k. Let v = v1 . . . vk ∈ V with len(v) = k
and Φ(v) = v∗. Let i=i1 . . . ik be the sequence of players such that vl ∈ Vil
(1 ≤ l ≤ k). Let iˆ i be an arbitrary extension such that iˆ i ∈ U. We need to show
that {φ(v) ∈ Vi | vˆv ∈ V} = {v∗ ∈ V∗ρ(i) | v∗ ˆv∗ ∈ V∗}. This follows from the
inductive hypothesis that Gv  GΦ(v), which implies by CE1: if vˆv ∈ V, then
v∗ ˆφ(v) ∈ V∗; and if v∗ ˆv∗ ∈ V∗, then there must be v ∈ V such that φ(v) = v∗.
Since i and v are arbitrary, this proves that {Φ(w) | w ∈ Vlen(v)} =V∗k+1.
For the other part of the claim, by inductive hypothesis, Gv  GΦ(v) for an
arbitrary v with len(v) = k, where Gv,GΦ(v) are in canonical form. Let vˆv ∈ V.
First, it is clear (by Definitions 2.5 and 2.10) that Gvˆv and G∗Φ(vˆv) are both in
canonical form, since Gvˆv, G∗Φ(vˆv) are restrictions of Gv, G
∗
v∗ respectively (by CE
2, 3, and 5), which are already in canonical form. Therefore, s f (Gvˆv)  redp(Gvˆv)
and s f (GΦ(vˆv))  redp(GΦ(vˆv)). Next, by assumption, redp(Γ)  redp(Γ∗). By
the definition of Φ above, we have redp(Gvˆv)  redp(GΦ(vˆv)). This gives us
s f (Gvˆv)  s f (GΦ(vˆv)). Also, by assumption, Γ and Γ∗ are in p-normal form, and
Gvˆv, GΦ(vˆv) are restrictions of Gv and GΦ(v), respectively, which are isomorphic
to each other. Therefore, it follows from Definition 2.5 that Gvˆv  GΦ(vˆv). 
Theorem 4. For every EGU Γ1,Γ2, Γ1 ∼ Γ2 iff Γ1 ≈ Γ2.
Proof. The desired result follows from Theorem 3 and Lemmas 4 and 5 by an
argument analogous to that given for Theorem 1. 
6 Conclusion
We have extended the Thompson transformations to games with unawareness.
Along the way, we identified a novel transformation, coalescing of players,
based on the insight that players are differentiated by their payoffs and, there-
fore, players with identical payoffs are strategically equivalent. In the case of
games with unawareness, we discovered that players are differentiated by both
payoffs and awareness. Consequently, from a strategic standpoint, a single
player should be analyzed as two distinct agents if he exhibits two distinct
states of awareness at different stages of a temporally extended game. The fact
that these two agents share payoffs, i.e. they constitute a team, will ensure their
actions are strategically coordinated. The next stage in this project is the in-
vestigation of solution concepts: which solution concepts are preserved under
each of these transformations and which are not?
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